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PRICE-EARNINGS RELATIVES - A NEW TWIST TO THE LOW-MULTIPLE STRATEGY
Latest computer research findings show· that there is a new investment
strategy which promises the investor high returns at relatively low risk.
This strategy is a new twist to the now popular but once forbidden low P/E
multiple approach.
PER.

The new twist is called the price-earnings relative or

As we will see later, our study shows that a low PER investment strategy

can produce higher returns at lower risk than the more traditional approaches.
In order to better understand how and why the PER investment approach works,
it is important to trace some of the events leading up to the PER concept!
Once upon a time, in a long-forgotten era of soaring stock prices, an astute disciple of fundamental sec.u rities analysis cautioned that many investors
and analysts alike were existing in an investment fairyland.

In his 1949

classic, The Intelligent Investor, Benjaiiii.n Graham maintained that stockmarket
participants are inclined to overreact to future corporate prospects.

In the

process, these Qtherwise rational investors would often engage in a sort of
"psychic" investing -- rallying around the most favorably viewed stocks, and
frequently chasing those coveted issues to exorbitant prices based on the
premise that another buyer could always be found at an even higher level.
Meanwhile, the least attractively regarded stocks would be relegated to an investors' graveyard-- to be avoided regardless of price.
Such overreactions manifest in the phenomenon that the fashionable stocks
are propelled to prices that are too steep, while the banished issues are apathetically priced too low.

This disparity becomes most evident when observing

the price-earnings ratios of the two categories of stocks.

The fashionable

stocks tend to sport lofty P/E ratios while the less popular issues possess
meager multiples.
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'Two-Tier' Market Revisited
The now infamous two-tier market of 1971-1972 provides recent confirmation of Graham's overreaction theory.

During that time investors singled out

approximately four dozen large-capitalization, above-average growth companies
and engaged in a titanic bidding warfare for those precious securities.
Prices of these "nifty fifty" growth stocks escalated to dizzying heights.

In

1972, Avon, Disney, and Polaroid, to name a few, all sold at prices in excess
of 80 times earnings.

At one point, the total market value of Avon exceeded

that of the entire domestic steel industry.

.

cern.

But price was not a major con-

No matter how much you paid for one of these elite issues, you would

prosper -- or so the theory went -- because growth would eventually bail you
out.

Of course, we all know that this speculative binge went the way of prior

manias.

The collapse of the nifty fifty was sudden and cruel.

By 1974, Avon,

Disney, and Polaroid had lost more than eighty per·c ent of their peak market
values.

Even regal IBM, the epitome of a "one-decision" stock, had more than

half of its market value lopped off.
The two-tier market was certainly not the first speculative binge, nor
will lt likely be the last.

But it does vividly portray the risks of driving

prices to extremes -- no matter how attractive the underlying company.

More

and more market analysts, having witnessed the brutality in which speculative
bubbles are burst, subscribe to Graham's stringent valuation theories.

In

particular, some of these analysts, who are labeled "contrarians," advocate
that investors should confine their purchases to quality, low-multiple stocks
while avoiding high-P/E issues.

These contrarians . argue that high-multiple

stocks have considerably greater downside price risk than do their low-P/E
counterparts.

In

eff~ct,

a low-P/E stock has already been pushed to the

3

depths of price so how much lower can it go?

On the other hand, a high multi-

ple stock that falls from investor favor has a considerable distance to decline before it reaches a more normal multiple level.
If Graham's early overreaction hypothesis is valid, then the basically

ignored lowest P/E stocks are presumably over-depressed and should eventually
adjust upwards to a more normal level.
higher-than-normal returns.

Such adjustments should lead to

On the other hand, the over-inflated, high--PE's

should at some time collapse to lower and more realistic levels, thereby depressing returns from these stocks.
Staying Out of Trouble
An investment strategy that reflects a contrarian's viewpoint is one that

concentrates on a diversified portfolio of selected low-multiple issues.
advantages of this strategy are twofold.

The

First, only stocks with depressed

P /E 's will be se=-lected -- thus limiting downside price risk (assuming, of
course that these firms are chosen based upon their ability to maintain earnings at a respectable level).

Second, high-multiple securities are avoided.

There£ore, the investor removes the possibility of experiencing a staggering
loss due to a multiple collapse.

While the investor runs the risk of owning a

stock that may be a lackluster performer for some time, he nevertheless stays
out of serious financial trouble by avoiding those high-P/E stocks that have
the potential of nosediving once the fickle investment community becomes disenchanted with them•
The overriding question becomes:

can one really achieve higher-than-

normal returns by adhering to a diversified, low-multiple investment strategy?
Indeed, two earlier Barron's articles ("Watch Those Multiples," February 28,
1977 and "For Widows and Orphans," December 3, 1979) address this query and
document the notion that low P/E portfolios over long time periods actually do

- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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outperform both the market and. high-P/E portfolios.

Other studies published

in academic and practitioner journals -have arrived at similar conclusions.
These studies, however, have often been criticized because they do not
con1ider two crucial factors that might bias their findings.

In particular,

prior studies neglect to compensate for the impact that risk and industry considerations could have on investment returns.

We shall attempt to devise an

investment strategy that compensates for these possible biases.

But first., we

shall take a look at how these non-PIE-related factors could influence portfolio returns.
Rilk/Return Tradeoffs
Several studies made during the 60's by competent professionals presented

the first evidence that low-P/E stocks generate abnormally high returns.
These studies revealed that indeed investors did overreact to corporate prospects by attributing lower-than-deserved P/E's to less glamourous stocks; however, he also discovered that the market eventually tended to rectify this
overreaction by pushing the multiple to a higher and more realistic level.
The results indicated that in the long run the lowest ratio stocks not only
dramatically outperformed the higher P/E stocks, but also significantly "beat
the market.
At approximately the same time that these low-P/E studies were appearing,
other professionals pointed out that some stocks are riskier than others.
They theorized that the return one can expect on any stock should be proportional to how risky the stock is in relation to the average stock.

The now

well-known "beta" factor was developed to gauge the risk of a particular
stock.

A beta of one designates a stock with price volatility comparable to

that of the market, while a beta larger than one indicates volatility that is
greater than the market's (vice versa for a beta less than one).
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Thus, an investor would logically .expect that a particular stock would
generate a higher-than-market return i f that stock has
beta.

a h;igher-than-market

Accordingly, the findings that low-P/E stocks produce higher-than-

market returns is not surprising if one believes that these low-ratio stocks
are riskier (high betas) than the market average.

In that event the excess

returns generated by low-multiple stocks would merely be a deserved risk premium that the investor demands for tolerating greater-than-market risk.

In

this sense, observing that low-multiple stocks outperform the market averages
would be no more unusual or unexpected than seeing that A-rated bonds provide
higher yields than AAA-rated issues. ·Unfortunately, none of these low-P/E
studies incorporated risk considerations into their analyses and therefore
their discovery of high returns for low-P/E stocks was not necessarily significant.
Industry Biases
Another possible deficiency of these earlier P/E studies was that they
neglected to compensate for the tremendous influence that industry considerations can have on price--earnings ratios.

Some industries, such as the one

comprised of food companies are typified by low-multiple securities, whereas
other industries (electronics, for example) contain numerous high-P /E issues •.
Thus a typical low-P/E portfolio would most likely contain proportionately
more securities from characteristically low-ratio industries, while containing
only a sparse sampling of stocks from high-P/E industries.

Accordingly, most

food company stocks, for example, would tend to cluster in low-P/E portfolios,
whereas most electronics stocks would be entered into high-P/E portfolios.
The implications of this type of portfolio construction are obvious:

any
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detected return differences between high- and low-multiple portfolios might be

caused by variances in industry performance rather than - the P/E level.
Our study compensates for industry bias by introducing a new type of

ear nings multiple which we shall call the price-earnings _r elative, or PER.

The PER is an index of the P/E ratio of a stock relative to that of its indus try, and is calculated by dividing a given stock's P/E by the average P/E
r atio for its related industry group.

A PER of 1.0, therefore, would indicate

that a stock's P/E is typical of its industry average.

In this manner, an

electronics stock with a P/E ratio of 10, for example, could have a lower PER
t han a food stock with a P/E of 6 because the electronics stock's P/E is lower
r e lative to its industry norm.
Looking Back
We undertook a study to determine if portfolios comprised of low-PER securities do indeed provide superior rates of return.

We analyzed forty stocks

from each of the electronics (high P/E's), paper/container (average P/E's),
and food (low P/E's) industries.
c ompu~ ed

The P/E ratio of each observed security was

quarterly from the beginning of 1970 to mid-year 1980.

The numerator

of this ratio is the closing market price per share at the end of the quarter
and the denominator is the sum of the four most recently reported quarterly
earnings per common share (fully diluted).

We then converted the resultant

P/E to a PER by dividing by the appropriate industry average P/E for that
quart er.
We arranged these stocks into ten separate portfolios, or deciles, according to thei r PER magnitude.
decile ten the hi ghest.

Decile one contains the lowest 10% of PER's;

Bot h cap.ital gains (losses ) a nd di vidends were i n-

c l uded in calculating the quarterly returns for each decile•
e xperiment three different times.

We repeated the

First, portfoli os were adjusted every three

ANNUALIZED COHPOUND RATES OF RETURN
January 1, 1970 - June 30, 1980

Lowest PER

Highest PER

Three Months
Average
Average
PER
Beta

Switching Portfolios After Each
Six Months
Annual
Average
Average
Return
PER
Beta

Decile

Annual
Return

1

31.64

• 48

1.07

26.10

.48

2

18.52

.63

1.03

15.86

3

16.64

.72

· 1.02

4

19.12

.80

5

18.40
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.

Annual
Return

One Year
Average
PER

Average
Beta

1. 07

23.69

.48

1.07

.63

1.03

17.45

.63

1.03

16.20

.72

1.02

18.78

.7Z

1.03

.99

18.42

.80

1.00

18.91

.80

1.00

.88

.98

18.66

.88

.97

17.43

.88

.98

11.36

.97

.97

9.52

.97

.97

12.92

.97

.98

7

8.44

1.06

.99

9.60

1.06

.99

12.25

1.06

.99

8

5.60

1.19

1.01

5.62

1.19

1.01

8.07

1.19

1. 01

9

10.00

1.39

1.05

11.06

1.39

1.05

10.75

1.40

1.04

10

2.20

1.97

1.16

3.24

1. 97

1.15

5.47

1.98

1.14

•

.....,
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mont hs, then every six months, and finally every year to reflect shifts in PER
ranki ngs.

Thus, for example, if a stock's PER increased beyond the boundaries

of its group, that stock would be "sold" at the end of the appropriate
"ewitching" period and replaced with the .lowest PER issue from the next highcut de cile.

The "sold" stock would then advance to a higher PER decile and be

"bought" for that portfolio.

The accompanying table presents the annual re-

turn , average PER, and average beta for each decile portfolio.

The Ri&ht Route
A glance at our table reveals some interesting insights.

For each of the

three portfolio switching periods, the typical first decile stock's P/E was

le as than half that of its respective industry norm-- i.e., a PER below 0.5.
What does this suggest?

A widely-touted investment axiom contends that a P/E

11 no more than a barometer gauging collective investor expectations regarding
a e tock's

outlo~k.

The higher the multiple the more favorable the prospects.

The n doesn't it follow that decile 1 securities receive low relative multiples
be ca use investors envision less-than-desirable prospects for those issues?
One would certainly think so.
But how perceptive are these investors?
vi des a surprising answer.

Another look at our table pro-

Clearly the low-PER deciles provided superior re-

t urns as compared to the high-PER groups.

For example, employing quarterly

portfolio adjustments, decile 1 returned 31.64% annually, substantially outdistancing decile lO's lethargic 2.20% yearly return.

In fact, the portfolio

r e turns declined consistently as the average PER increased.
These findings may come as sacrilege to those investment gurus_ who preach
a strategy of accumulating the stocks of highly visible firms with superior
ea rnings prospects.

But often too many gurus worship too few stocks.

The
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implication is obvious.

Those sacrosanct issues may be driven to heavenly

heights while the castouts languish in an investor

purgat~.

Enter Mr. Graham and his overreaction theory.
from glamourous, is strikingly .appropriate.

His message, though far

Avoid those revered stocks.

Their prices, already reflecting outstanding growth potential, are too vulnerable to any disappointment that may disillusion investors.
look at decile 10 stocks.

To illustrate,

on average, these favorites sold at almost twice

the normal P/E ratio of their respective industries.

If investor expectations

regarding one of these stocks wanes, causing the P/E to adjust to an average
level, then the outcast issue's price would almost halve.

Or even worse, if

its new unpopularity is coupled with an actual earnings collapse, the price
deterioriationcould be far more staggering.

Apparently enough of the once-

heralded stocks of the seventies fell from investor favor to cause the highPER portfolios to consistently underperform both the market and the low-PER
issues.
But consider the low-PER securities.

What worse can happen?

stocks have already been exiled to an investor dungeon.
issues, bad news is expected.

These

Unlike the glamour

Such expectations have already depressed prices

so bad news really doesn't have that much additional impact.
stocks don't have that much to lose.

In effect, these

Just as the glamour issues were viewed

with too much optimism, the outcasts were frequently regarded too negatively.
Apparently enough pleasant surprises happened to produce superior investment
returns for these outcasts.
A Beta Way
So low-PER stocks produce above-average returns.

To determine i f this

finding is noteworthy~ we still must address the problem of risk.
higher returns are to be expected i f risk is also higher.

After all,

Risk has always

l
i

10
btUUl
i lll ti

an elusive concept and possibly that is why it is often avoided in stud-

like this.

But risk is important -- maybe even more so than return.

m1t.te cll y there is no consensus of opinion about how to define risk.

Ad-

Neverthe-

lc:UU11 an increasingly popular definition identifies risk as the potential vol-

&tLl:l.tY of a security's returns..

More volatility translates to more risk.

As mentioned earlier, a stock's beta measures its volatility relative to
that of the market.

For purposes of our analysis, let's assume that beta is

an •clequate surrogate for the riskiness of a stock.
art•te r the risk.

The higher the beta the

Referring again to our table, one can observe a revealing

patte rn in the array of beta risk among the PER deciles.
faat ures of these patterns emerge:

In particular, three

(1) the high beta portfolios group at both

the low and high deciles, (2) the portfolio betas decelerate while moving from
daci le 1 toward the middle deciles, then accelerate as the movement advances
towa r d decile 10, and (3) the average beta is higher at decile 10 than decile

1.

This pattern implies that the risk of a stock increases as its P/E ratio

bec omes more dissimilar from its industry average P/E.

Furthermore, this risk

• ppears to increase at an accelerating rate with the highest risk associated
wit h those securities whose P/E's are farthest from the industry mean.
Under these conditions, one would predict higher returns for the high and
low PER portfolios (higher risk deserves higher return).

An examination of

our table, however, clearly shows that these results do not materialize.

The

mos t blatant contradiction to this idea can be observed by comparing the ret urns of the lowest versus the highest PER portfolios.

Decile 1 substantially

outperforms decile 10, even though decile 1 possesses slightly less beta risk.
Thus, our results are strengthened.

Low decile stocks outperform high PER

se curities and they do so without exposing the investor to additional risk.
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We decreased the frequency of altering portfolio composition to determine
if these same results occurred when portfolio changes were made less often.
Our table shows what happens when semiannual and annual switching were used.
Just like with quarterly switching, the lowest PER decile provided the largest
return.

Also, the portfolio returns generally declined as the PER increased.

These results conform to those experienced by the quarterly adjusted portfolios.
However, another pattern emerged.

As the frequency of portfolio changing

decreased, the returns generated by the lowest decile group declined while the
returns of the highest decile increased.

As a result, the spread between the

returns for decile 1 and decile 10 narrowed as the frequency of portfolio alteration diminished.

Seemingly, more frequent updating of low PER portfolios,

i.e., more rapid deletion of stocks whose PER's have advanced beyond the decile boundary, is useful for enhancing portfolio returns.
Summing It Up
Our findings show that the investor may achieve substantially higher than
average returns by adopting a strategy of selecting stocks whose P/E ratios
are low in relation to their industry average.

A well diversified portfolio

of such stocks yielded returns well above the normal premium predicted by
their risk level.

At the same time, such a portfolio exhibits less than aver-

age downward risk.
The low PER portfolio should be reviewed each quarter (each time company
earnings are reported) to monitor any significant shifts in PER's.

Our expe-

rience indicates that about one quarter of the portfolio will need to be
rolled over at that time.
once each year.

An alternative strategy is to adjust the portfolio

Returns are lower here but are partially offset by reduced

transaction costs and tax advantages.
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